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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0") (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue: Did Judge Bohling err when he interpreted section 38-l-7(l)(a) & (b) of the 
Utah Code and determined McKelPs work was either for "a residence," requiring McKell to 
record its lien within ninety (90) days after last furnishing labor, materials, equipment or services 
to the "residence," or that work on the Project ceased or was abandoned, requiring McKell to 
record its lien within ninety (90) days after cessation or abandonment of work on a project "not 
involving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102", rather than "within 90 days from the date 
of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence" as plainly stated in the 
statute? 
Standard of Review: Judge Bohling's ruling is subject to review under the correction of 
error standard. Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999); Orton v. Carter, 970 
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 47 P.3d 
92, 94 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002); Coulter & Smith v. Russell, 
976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). "In the case of a summary judgment the party against whom the judgment has been 
granted is entitled to have all the facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom 
considered in a light most favorable to him." Young v. Texas Co., 331 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 
1958). 
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Second Issue: Did Judge Bohling err when he ruled as a matter of law that McKell's 
unjust enrichment claim against Holmes was barred by the existence of an express contract, 
where McKell furnished labor, material, equipment of services to adjoining subdivisions (one of 
which was developed by Holmes) under a written contract with Husting Land & Development, 
Inc. and Eagle Pointe Financial, but where McKell had no express contract with Holmes? 
Standard of Review: The issue of unjust enrichment is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Judge Bohling's legal findings are reviewed for correctness; the trial court is granted broad 
discretion in applying the law to the facts. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580 
(Utah 2000); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999). "In 
the case of a summary judgment the party against whom the judgment has been granted is 
entitled to have all the facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered 
in a light most favorable to him." Young v. Texas Co., 331 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1958). 
Third Issue: As the successful parties under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1, et seq., Holmes 
filed a Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees. The issue for review is whether the amount of 
attorney's fees awarded by Judge Bohling ($25,000 out of a total request of $30,447) was 
proper? 
Standard of Review: Judge Bohling's ruling is subject to review under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998); Baldwin v. 
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993); J V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3): 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
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improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner ... shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise ... 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) & (b) (2002) (excerpted here; included verbatim in the 
Addendum): 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record ... a written 
notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or 
material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38- 11-
102;or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined 
in Section 38-11-102. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (2) (2002): "Construction on an owner-occupied 
residence" means designing, engineering, constructing, altering, remodeling, improving, 
repairing, or maintaining a new or existing residence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (15) (2002): "Owner" means a person who: 
(a) contracts with a person who is licensed as a contractor or is exempt from 
licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, for 
the construction on an owner-occupied residence upon real property owned by 
that person; 
(b) contracts with a real estate developer to buy a residence upon completion of 
the construction on the owner-occupied residence; or 
(c) buys a residence from a real estate developer after completion of the 
construction on the owner-occupied residence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (16) (2002): "Owner-occupied residence" means a 
residence that is, or after completion of the construction on the residence will be, occupied by the 
3 
owner or the owner's tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days from 
the date of the completion of the construction on the residence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (19) (2002): "Real estate developer" means a person 
having an ownership interest in real property who contracts for the construction of a residence 
that is offered for sale to the public. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (20) (2002): "Residence" means an improvement to real 
property used or occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or 
secondary detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, including 
factory built housing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-107 (2002): 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the real 
property associated with that residence under the provisions of Title 38, Chapter 
1, Mechanics' Liens, who provides qualified services under an agreement 
effective on or after January 1, 1995, other than directly with the owner, shall be 
barred after January 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon that residence and real 
property or recovering a judgment in any civil action against the owner or the 
owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for qualified services provided 
by that person if: 
(a) the conditions described in Subsections 38-ll-204(3)(a) and (3)(b) are met; or 
(b) (i) a subsequent owner purchases a residence from an owner; 
(ii) the subsequent owner who purchased the residence under Subsection (l)(b)(i) 
occupies the residence as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days from 
the date of transfer or the residence is occupied by the subsequent owner's tenant 
or lessee as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days from the date of 
transfer; and 
(iii) the owner from whom the subsequent owner purchased the residence met the 
conditions described in Subsections 38-ll-204(3)(a) and (3)(b). 
(2) If a residence is constructed under conditions that do not meet all of the 
provisions of Subsection (1), that residence and the real property associated with 
that residence as defined in Section 38-1-4, shall be subject to any mechanics' lien 
as provided in Section 38-1-3. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This case involves a contractor's right to recover from a developer for the reasonable 
value of furnishing infrastructure improvements (sewer, water, curb, gutter, and roadway) for a 
residential subdivision. Two developers, Hustings and Holmes and Coulter & Smith, sometimes 
referred to as Holmes/Mesa1 ("Holmes" or "Developers") owned adjacent parcels of land in 
Draper, Utah which each intended to develop as a residential subdivision. Access to Hustings' 
parcel (Galena Hills) was through Holmes and Coulter & Smith's parcel (Parkway Estates). 
Consequently, the developers entered into an Adjoining Subdivision Agreement in which they 
agreed Hustings would contract for the infrastructure improvements for both parcels and be 
reimbursed pro rata for the cost of improvements furnished for the Holmes' parcel. Husting 
terminated the original infrastructure contractor, Construct Tech, and after filing a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition, contracted with McKell for the improvements. McKell installed 
improvements for both parcels and sought approval of the bankruptcy court to be paid as an 
administrative expense, but was denied. At the same time, the bankruptcy Trustee sought 
approval to complete Husting's development plans, including Husting's obligations under the 
Adjoining Subdivision Agreement. The bankruptcy court authorized the Trustee to contract with 
Eagle Pointe Financial to complete the subdivision, and Eagle Pointe subsequently contracted 
with McKell to complete the work. Holmes filed an adversary proceeding against the Trustee 
which was ultimately settled. Holmes sold the parcel to the City of Draper. McKell now seeks 
recovery for the reasonable value of the infrastructure work installed on the Holmes parcel. 
1
 Coulter & Smith is the successor in interest to Mesa Development, Inc. (Record 253, f 4). 
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McKell's counterclaim in this action seeks recovery for the reasonable value of labor, 
materials, equipment, and services comprising the culinary and sanitary water system, curb and 
gutter, storm drain, road base and asphalt McKell furnished to Holmes for the Parkway Estates 
Subdivision project. McKell asserted two claims for relief. First, the right to recover under the 
equitable theory of unjust enrichment. Second, the right to foreclose the mechanic's lien McKell 
recorded against the subdivision on June 7, 2000. (Record 28 - 49). 
On November 13, 2000, Holmes filed a complaint against McKell seeking the removal of 
the mechanic's lien, alleging the lien slandered title to the subdivision, and seeking damages for 
tortious interference with the prospective economic relationship between Holmes and potential 
buyers of the subdivision. (Record 1-17). On December 8, 2000, McKell answered and 
counterclaimed. (Record 28 - 49). The Developers replied on December 21, 2000. (Record 50 
- 58). Developers filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supporting memorandum 
and affidavits on May 20, 2002. (Record 99 -255). McKell filed a memorandum in opposition 
with supporting affidavits on June 5, 2002. (Record 256 - 317). Developers replied on June 21, 
2002. (Record 318 - 333). The court heard argument on August 12, 2002 and granted the 
motion. (Record 340). 
Judge Bohling's Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was entered on 
October 9, 2002. (Record 364-366). The court did not articulate any Findings of Fact 
supporting its ruling, but did reach the legal conclusion that "Defendants failed to record the 
Notice of Claim of Lien within the time period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) and 
(b) and that Defendant's quantum meruit claim fails as a matter of law because of the existence 
of an express contract." (Id. at 365). McKell contests those conclusions. 
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On April 25, 2003, Developers filed their Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees with 
supporting memorandum and joint affidavit, seeking to recover $30,447.00 pursuant to Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. (Record 372 - 397). On May 20, 2003, 
McKell filed its memorandum in opposition. (Record 399 - 407). Developers replied on May 
28, 2003. (Record 408 - 414). The court heard argument on the motion on July 14, 2003, and 
granted the motion, but reduced the amount of reimbursable fees to $25,000. (Record 420). The 
court entered its Order Granting Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees on August 5, 2003. 
(Record 426 - 427). McKell believes the fee award is excessive notwithstanding the reduction 
ordered by the court. 
The court entered a Final Judgment on August 6, 2003 (Record 423 - 425), the parties 
having stipulated to dismiss Holmes' remaining claims (Record 418-419) and the court having 
entered its Order Dismissing Second and Third Claims for Relief in Plaintiffs' Complaint on July 
14, 2003. (Record 421 - 422). McKell filed its Notice of Appeal on August 27, 2003 (Record 
437 - 439), and its Amended Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2003 (Record 446 - 448). 
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II. Statement of Facts. 
1. Husting Land & Development was incorporated in 1994 for the purpose of 
developing a sixty-one acre, three-phase, sixty-nine lot residential subdivision in Draper, Utah, 
commonly known as Galena Hills. 
Adjacent to Galena Hills was another subdivision development project, Parkway 
Estates, owned by John Holmes Construction, Inc. and Holmes Mesa 
Construction, Inc. (Holmes Mesa). Because Galena Hills required access through 
the Parkway Estates property, and Galena Hills and Parkway Estates shared 
common areas and roadways, it was necessary to install certain improvements and 
utilities that would benefit both subdivisions. Thus, Husting and Holmes Mesa 
entered into an Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement in which Husting agreed to 
complete certain improvements on Parkway Estates, and Holmes Mesa agreed to 
reimburse Husting on a pro rata basis for its construction expenses. The 
Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement provided that reimbursement funds would not 
be paid to Husting until twenty-four months after final inspection and approval of 
construction by various municipalities, and then only if certain other conditions 
were met. 
(Record 148-149). 
2. Following are excerpts from and summaries of provisions from the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement (it is reproduced verbatim in the Addendum): 
"There are aspects of the development of each subdivision that are common to 
and shared by both Galena and Parkway. These common characteristics include 
contribution and development of common areas, installation of utilities to the 
benefit of both subdivisions, and development of common roadways." 
"By this Agreement, the parties intend to agree upon the allocation of costs and 
responsibilities associated with these matters of common concern." 
The following costs would be borne equally (50/50) by HLD/Apache and 
Holmes/Mesa: (1) Sewer Line installed from the trunk line across county land 
within a 15 foot easement granted by the county...(2) Entrance landscaping, 
improvements, and signage at the intersection of Galena Park Boulevard and 
12300 South Street. 
The following costs would be borne 65/35 by HLD/Apache and Holmes/Mesa, 
respectively: (1) Impact fee to Draper. (2) Costs of improvement of private 20-
foot lane ... utility stubs, fencing along railroad tracks, re-routing of irrigation 
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system within the common area and under Galena Park Blvd. and other 
improvements as required by Draper. (3) "Because Galena Park Boulevard 
services and benefits both subdivisions, the parties agree to split the following 
costs on a 65/35" between HLD/Apache and Holmes Mesa, respectively: (a) full 
costs of land, surface and underground improvements for curb, gutter, sidewalk, 
excavation, asphalt, electric power, gas, telephone, and TV cables and storm drain 
on both sides of Galena Park Blvd. from 12300 South to the north line -
extended- of Lot 36 Parkway; and (b) full costs of land, surface and underground 
improvements for only the east one-half of Galena Park Blvd. along the frontage 
of the common area south from the north line of Lot 36, to the north lot line of 
Lot 1 Parkway; (c) one-half the cost of the sewer, water and utility stubs from 
12300 South to the north lot line of Lot 1 Parkway...(e) "Except for the items 
referred to above, Holmes/Mesa shall be responsible to reimburse HLD/Apache 
for the actual costs for the development of all other portions of Galena Park Blvd. 
situated within the Parkway Subdivision, including the surface and subsurface 
improvements. The estimated cost for these improvements is $200,000.00...(4) 
Improvements at 12300 South as required by Draper City and UDOT to include 
removal of trees, relocation of utility poles, lines and water meters, removal of 
shed and concrete pad, widening of the pavement, installation of fence, and 
installation of curb, gutter and sidewalks on the south side of the road shall be 
paid 65% by HLD/Apache and 35% by Holmes/Mesa...(5) Alterations or 
improvements to Galena Canal and any storm drain line from Galena Canal to 
Jordan River Canal required by Draper shall be paid 65% by HLD/Apache and 
35%o by Holmes/Mesa. 
HLD/Apache shall have lien rights on the first phase of the Parkway Estates 
Subdivision which shall secure the payments owed from Holmes/Mesa to 
HLD/Apache for the improvements. 
Successors and assigns bound by the Agreement. 
(Record 301-310). 
3. Husting and Construct Tech entered into a Development Agreement in February 
1996 in which Construct Tech agreed to furnish the infrastructure for the Galena Hills and 
Parkway Estates subdivision projects. (Record 149). 
4. Husting terminated Construct Tech because of late and defective work in 
November 1996. (Record 150). 
5. Husting filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case on January 14, 1997, and continued to 
operate as a debtor in possession. (Record 150). 
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6. In April 1997, Husting contracted with McKell to remediate and repair Construct 
Tech's defective work and to complete the project, including work on the Parkway Estates 
property, on a time and materials basis. Specifically, "[McKell] agreed to correct the defective 
work performed pre-petition by Construct Tech and to complete the remaining work on Phase II 
of the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates projects on a time and materials basis." (Record 150-
151) (emphasis added). 
7. McKell started work on June 30, 1997. (Record 193). 
8. "Prior to entering into the Construction Agreement, [McKell] was aware that 
Husting had filed for relief under Chapter 11 and understood that the only present sources of 
payment for its work was the approximate $612,000 in the Escrow Accounts established 
pursuant to the bonds with Draper City and the Salt Lake County Sewer District. However, ... 
[Husting] also led McKell to believe that other sources of payment existed, including the 
Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement, and funds from Castle Homes, L.L.C., a third-party investor 
that purportedly intended to purchase and build homes on the lots once the underground and 
surface improvements had been completed by [McKell]..." (Record 151). 
9. After starting work, McKell met with Nathan Coulter, President of Coulter & 
Smith, at least twice. The purpose of the meetings was for Coulter to indicate the location of 
water and sewer laterals on Parkway Estates lots accessed by Galena Park Boulevard, and to 
make sure McKell Excavating stubbed in sewer and water mains to future streets in Parkway 
Estates. Coulter also asked for a bid to complete a cul-de-sac off Galena Park Boulevard and to 
complete a subsequent phase of Parkway Estates. McKell Excavating installed the water and 
sewer lines off Galena Park Boulevard and installed the sewer and water mains for future streets 
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in Parkway Estates. All of this work was inspected and accepted by the Salt Lake County Sewer 
Improvement District and Draper City. (Record 314, ^ 3). 
10. Holmes knew McKell was performing work on the Parkway Estates proj ect in 
1997 because on October 2, 1997, McKell met with Holmes and was told "that the Project was 
going to be bought out and that Castle Homes would assume liability for payment of McKell's 
invoices..." (Record 131, Ijl6). 
11. "Shortly after RAM began working on the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates 
projects, it became apparent that neither McKell nor Husting had realized the scope of corrective 
work that would have to be done. Indeed, rather than simply correcting Construct Tech's 
deficiencies, most of the culinary and sanitary water lines and systems previously installed had to 
be completely removed and replaced.. .in November of 1997, RAM ceased performing under the 
Construction Agreement because Husting and/or third parties had failed to pay past-due invoices 
and because further payment or funding from the Escrow Accounts, the Adjoining Subdivisions 
Agreement and third-party investors appeared unlikely to materialize in the near future.. .RAM 
invoiced $969,633.08 to Husting for materials and labor supplied for performing corrective work 
and making improvements to the Galena Hills and Parkway Estates projects." (Record 152) 
(emphasis added). 
12. On November 4, 1997, McKell stopped work because of non-payment. (Record 
152). 
13. ".. .a substantial part of [McKell's] work was performed on property owned by 
Holmes Mesa to satisfy Husting's obligations under the pre-petition Adjoining Subdivisions 
Agreement." (Record 163) (emphasis added). 
14. On January 20, 1998, F. Wayne Elggren was appointed Trustee. (Record 153). 
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15. Developers concede that work under the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement was 
not complete and that as early as May and June of 1998, and later in 1998, the Trustee informed 
them that he intended to perform under the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement. Developers 
received information from the project engineer regarding the three bids to complete the work, 
including McKell's bid. (Record 284, f t 7 & 8; 291-294, ffif 7, 8 & 14 - 16). 
16. By February 19, 1999, the Trustee reached a tentative agreement with McKell and 
Eagle Pointe under which the project could be completed. (Record 315). 
17. The Trustee filed a Motion for Order Approving Post Petition Financing With 
Eagle Pointe Financial Group and Eagle Pointe Realty and Management, Inc., and argument on 
the motion was heard on July 23, 1999. On September 8, 1999, the bankruptcy court entered its 
Order Approving Post-Petition Financing. (Record 169). The order states: "Eagle Pointe 
Financial will complete the construction of the Project and associated improvements..." (Record 
171,11). 
18. Pursuant to the Order, Eagle Pointe contracted with McKell to complete Phases I, 
II, and III, plus associated improvements for the Project, including the construction of a road and 
related improvements through the Parkway Estates project as required by the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement. (Record 177, 191 & 315). 
19. This work started in September 1999 and included construction of a permanent 
road along Galena Park Boulevard through the Parkway Estates property (curb & gutter, storm 
drain, road base and asphalt) as required by the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement. The work 
cost $205,534.29, and as of April 2000, was 74% complete. (Record 298-299, ffif 3 - 6). 
20. McKell recorded its mechanic's lien on June 7, 2000. (Record 193-194). 
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21. In August 2000, based on then existing market conditions, Developers made a 
business decision to sell the Parkway Estates property to the City of Draper rather than 
continuing to develop it for residential use, believing that market conditions would have limited 
any "benefit" from the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement, even if Husting had immediately 
performed all of its obligations under the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement. (Record 287, f 
19). 
22. Eagle Pointe sells lots within the Galena Hills subdivision, and by June 2002, is 
ready to proceed with completing Phase III of the Project. (Record 316, fflf 9, 10). 
23. McKell's work performed on behalf of the Trustee through Eagle Pointe is 
substantially the same as the work McKell agreed to perform under the Construction Agreement 
with Husting. (Record 316,111). 
24. Developers concede the Parkway Estates property benefited from work performed 
under the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement, offering to return the value of the benefit in the 
adversary proceeding against the Trustee. (Record 287,120; 295, ^ f 18). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Bohling incorrectly interpreted the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
7(l)(a) (2002) when he determined McKell's work was for "a residence," (Transcript of Hearing 
on Summary Judgment Motion at 39), requiring McKell to record its lien within ninety (90) days 
after last furnishing labor, materials, equipment or services to the "residence." The plain 
language of section 38-l-7(l)(a) refers to work performed for "a residence as defined in Section 
38-11-102" and, when read in conjunction with Utah's Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-11-101, et seq.9 applies to work performed in the 
construction of an owner-occupied residence, not to infrastructure improvements furnished for an 
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entire subdivision. In the alternative, Judge Bohling incorrectly interpreted the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(b) (2002) when he ruled that work on the Project was finally 
completed upon cessation or abandonment of McKell's contract with Husting (Transcript of 
Hearing on Summary Judgment Motion at 39-40), and requiring McKell, as a matter of law, to 
record its mechanic's lien within ninety (90) days after cessation or abandonment of work. The 
plain language of section 38-l-7(l)(b) requires mechanic's lien claimants to file suit to record 
their mechanic's lien no later than ninety (90) days after final completion of an original contract 
not involving a residence. The plain meaning of "final completion" is that a contract is not 
finally complete until everything required to be done under the contract is complete. McKell's 
contract was not finally complete when McKell recorded its lien. This interpretation is 
consistent with the legislature's intent when it enacted amendments to Utah's mechanic's lien 
statute which became effective in 1994 and 1995, and with Utah law. 
Judge Bohling incorrectly applied the law to the facts when he ruled McKell's unjust 
enrichment claim was barred by the existence of an express contract. There is no dispute there is 
no express contract between McKell, conferor of the benefit, and Holmes, conferee of the 
benefit. To the extent Judge Bohling was referring to the Husting - Eagle Pointe - McKell 
contract, he should have denied the motion because the record, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to McKell, established all the elements for an unjust claim against Holmes. At a 
minimum, Judge Bohling should have denied the motion due to the existence of genuine issues 
of material fact regarding the unjust enrichment claim. 
Judge Bohling abused his discretion in evaluating Holmes' request for fees because he 
did not evaluate the request consistent with Utah law. Holmes' request for fees should have been 
denied in its entirety because Holmes failed to meet its evidentiary burden to support the request. 
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Holmes' failure to allocate fees between recoverable claims and non-recoverable claim is fatal. 
Moreover, the fees awarded remain unreasonable, the difficulty of the litigation did not support 
an award of fees of $25,000, and counsel was inefficient in the work which was accomplished. 
OVERVIEW OF AMENDMENTS TO THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
The mechanic's lien statute in effect before May 2, 1994, required lien claimants to 
record their mechanic's lien "within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or 
improvement" and to file suit to foreclose the lien "within twelve months after the completion of 
the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days." Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7(1) & 11 (emphasis added). Case law interpreting the version of section 38-
1-7 in effect before May 2, 1994 established a two-part test for determining the timeliness of 
recording the lien: first, whether the project was substantially complete; and second, whether the 
project was accepted by the owner. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith 
Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). In 1994, the legislature 
amended the statute to distinguish between residential and non-residential projects. 
In the 1994 General Session, as part of the Residence and Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund act, Utah's elected representatives amended sections 38-1-7 and 11, changing the 
triggering events and times for recording and foreclosing a mechanic's lien dependent upon 
whether the project was residential or non-residential construction. Effective May 2, 1994, lien 
claimants were required to record their lien "within 90 days from the date the person last 
performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or improvement" 
and to foreclose the lien within "twelve months from the date the lien claimant last performed 
labor and services or last furnished equipment or material on an original contract not involving a 
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residence" or within "180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services 
or last furnished equipment or material for a residence..." 1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) 
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11). These amendments remained 
effective until April 30, 1995, at which point the legislature changed the statute again. 
In the 1995 General Session, the legislature clarified the timing requirement for recording 
a lien on a residence, and changed the triggering event for recording and foreclosing a 
mechanic's lien on a non-residential project. Effective May 1, 1995, lien claimants were 
required to record their lien "within 90 days from the date the person last performed labor or 
service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or improvement for a residence as 
defined in Section 38-11-102." For non-residential projects, lien claimants were required to 
record their lien within "90 days from the date.. .of final completion of an original contract not 
involving a residence..." and to foreclose the lien within "twelve months from the date of final 
completion of the original contract not involving a residence..." 1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 
115) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11) (emphasis added).2 
ARGUMENT 
I. Judge Bohling committed reversible error when he ruled McKelPs infrastructure 
work was "for a residence,55 and analyzed the timeliness of McKelPs lien under section 38-
l-7(l)(a); or in the alternative, when he ruled McKell was required to record a lien within 
ninety (90) days after cessation or abandonment of work on the Project. 
A. Judge Bohling incorrectly concluded that McKell's work was for "a residence as defined in 
Section 38-11-102," and therefore applied the wrong subdivision of section 38-1-7 when 
analyzing whether McKell timely recorded its mechanic's lien. 
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Initially, McKell had a right to record a mechanic's lien for work it furnished to the 
Parkway Estates property under Husting's direction and approval. 
Contractors...performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or 
equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or 
structure or improvement to any premises in any manner.. .shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed 
labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting 
by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise... 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added). Husting acted as the agent of Holmes when it 
contracted with McKell to perform work required under the Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement. 
At no time before November 1997, when McKell stopped work because of non-payment, did 
Holmes inform McKell that Husting was not authorized to contract for such work. Quite the 
contrary, McKell met with representatives of Holmes and was assured it would be paid for its 
work. At this point, and notwithstanding Holmes' purported refusal to have authorized the 
employment of McKell in writing, Holmes ratified Husting's actions. "It is well-established 
under Utah law that 'subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract made on his behalf by 
one who had at the time neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes a ratification, which in 
general is as effectual as an original authorization.'" Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) citing Moses v. Archie McFarland & Son, 230 P.2d 571, 573 (Utah 1951). 
Moreover, "A principal's retention of the fruits of a contract can also serve as an implied 
ratification of the contract." Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d at 1219. 
Statutory construction requires the court to implement legislative intent in light of the 
purpose of the statute under review. Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 70 P.3d 85 (Utah 2003). The first 
2
 The 2001 General Session amended section 38-1-11 yet again to add the current subsection (4), 
but those changes are not relevant to the issues before the court. 2001 Utah Laws 198 (S.B. 
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step in understanding the intent of the legislature is to consider the plain language of the statute. 
Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1996). "According to traditional 
statutory interpretation methods, we look to the plain meaning of unambiguous statutory 
language." Pickett v. State, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "In construing a statute, 
we assume that 'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.' " Id., quoting Savage 
Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991); Cox Rock Prods, v. Walker 
Pipeline Constr.t 752 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The court may look to dictionary 
definitions to determine the plain meaning of statutory language. "Utah courts have a 'long 
history of relying on dictionary definitions to determine plain meeting.' " Brixen & Christopher 
Architects, P.C. v. State, 29 P.3d 650, 655 (Utah 2001); quoting State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986 
(Utah 1999). However, words should not be defined out of context. Consequently, a court 
"must 'give meaning, where possible, to all provisions of a statute' ... and interpret the 
provisions 'in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other statutes under 
the same and related chapters.' " Brixen, supra, at 655. (Citations omitted). 
The plain language of section 38-l-7(l)(a) refers to work performed for "a residence as 
defined in Section 38-11-102" and, when read in conjunction with Utah's Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-11-101, et seq., applies to work 
performed in the construction of an owner-occupied residence, not to infrastructure 
improvements furnished for an entire subdivision. "We analyze the language of a statutory 
provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we attempt to harmonize 
the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give meaning to each provision." 
254). 
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Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174,1177 (Utah 2002). 
The current statutory requirement for a contractor to record a lien for work on a residence was 
enacted as part of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 1994 Utah Laws 
Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11; §§ 38-11-101, et 
seq.) The Act creates an administrative remedy and process for unpaid subcontractors and 
suppliers who furnish labor and materials for improvement of an owner-occupied residence in 
lieu of a mechanic's lien, but only if the owner of the residence complies with requirements of 
the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-107 (2002). "Residence" means "an improvement to real 
property used or occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or 
secondary detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, including 
factory built housing." Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (20) (2002). The Act distinguishes 
between an "owner," Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (15) (2002), an "owner-occupied residence," 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (16) (2002), and a "real-estate developer," Utah Code Ann. § 38-
11-102 (19) (2002), extending protection against residential mechanic's liens to owners for work 
done on an "owner-occupied residence." But no such protection is extended to developers. This 
result is consistent with the purpose of the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund 
Act as expressed by its sponsor, Senator Scott Howell, which was to protect individual 
homeowners from mechanic's liens. On February 3, 1994, in debate upon the floor of the Utah 
State Senate, Sen. Howell stated: 
...SB 87 is a consumer bill that is designed to protect homeowners from 
mechanics liens being filed against their homes where the homeowner has already 
paid for the work. Without this protection, our existing law subjects the 
homeowner to liability not once but twice, for the work. Besides protecting the 
consumers, a lien recovery fund will be created in which subcontractors, 
suppliers, and laborers may file claims for payment for their work where the 
general contractor has failed to pay or - pay for them after having been paid by 
the homeowner. 
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Senate Office Tape 16 at 973 (emphasis added). See, Affidavit of Leslie McLean, f3, 
reproduced verbatim in the Addendum. Because the amendment to section 38-l-7(l)(a) was 
included in S.B. 87, whose purpose was to protect homeowners from mechanic's lien, the time 
limit included in section 38-l-7(l)(a) for recording a lien should not be applied to protect 
developers from liens for work furnished to an entire subdivision. 
McKell's work - installation of water, sewer, storm sewer, utilities, roads, and curb and 
gutter for a multi-lot subdivision - is plainly not work for "a residence as defined in Section 38-
11-102." McKell's work cannot be occupied by an owner, and should not be classified as the 
type of work to which the protections afforded by the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act apply. In First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the court found that the infrastructure work provided by the lien claimant 
benefited the entire 44 acre subdivision, could not be characterized as "off-site" work which 
would not impart notice of the existence of lienable work to a lender, and hence, the lien 
claimant had priority over the lender's blanket mortgage covering the entire subdivision. The 
court wrote: 
It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' lien that the material or labor 
be furnished solely on a building structure or that the work be performed solely on 
the lot on which a building is being erected. We agree ... that a contractor should 
not be barred from enjoying the benefits of the mechanics' lien statute where his 
work not only enhances the value of the developer's land, but is also necessary to 
make residences to be built on such property habitable ... where a developer 
engages the contractor to install a sewer system for a subdivision project, the 
contractor, if he complies with required statutory procedures, is entitled to a 
mechanics' lien against the developer's property for the cost of labor and 
materials furnished. 
600 P.2d at 525 (citations omitted). Similarly, McKell's work benefited the entire Parkview 
Estates subdivision, not just individual lots; and therefore cannot be characterized as work for "a 
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residence." Judge Bohling erred when he analyzed the timeliness of the recording of McKell's 
mechanic's lien under section 38-l-7(l)(a). This court should reverse. 
B. The plain language of section 38-l-7(l)(b) does not require mechanic's lien claimants to 
record the lien within ninety (90) days after a cessation or abandonment of the work. Judge 
Bohling committed reversible error when he read this requirement into the statute. 
Judge Bohling incorrectly interpreted the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
7(1 )(b) (2002) when he ruled that work on the Project was finally completed upon cessation or 
abandonment of McKell's contract with Husting (Transcript of Hearing on Summary Judgment 
Motion at 39-40), and requiring McKell, as a matter of law, to record a mechanic's lien within 
ninety (90) days after the cessation or abandonment of work. 
In establishing legislative intent, the court may look to dictionary definitions to determine 
the plain meaning of statutory language. "Utah courts have a 'long history of relying on 
dictionary definitions to determine plain meeting.' " Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. v. 
State, 29 P.3d 650, 655 (Utah 2001); quoting State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986 (Utah 1999); see also, 
McBride v. Huard, 2004 UT 21 (Utah 2004) (refering to dictionary to define "condition 
precedent" for purposes of interpreting Utah Health Care Malpractice Act). 
The legislature intended for the time period to record a mechanic's lien on a non-
residential project to begin to run when the original contract between the contractor and owner is 
at its end. "Final" means "being the last of a series, process, or progress; of or relating to the 
ultimate purpose or result of a process." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 463 (1984). 
"Completion" is defined as "the act or process of completing; the quality or state of being 
complete." Id. at 269. "Complete" means "fully carried out." Id. Applying these definitions to 
section 38-l-7(l)(b), all of the requirements under the original contract must be accomplished 
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before the time to file suit to foreclose the lien on a non-residential project begins to run. The 
Indiana Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Moduform, Inc. v. Harry H. Verkler 
Contractor, Inc., 681 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). There, the court was required to 
determine the legislative intent expressed in the Indiana statute requiring claimants on a public 
project payment bond to file their action on the bond "within sixty (60) days after the date of the 
final completion and acceptance of the public work." Id. at 247; quoting Ind. Code. § 36-1-12-
13.1(d)(e). Looking to the plain language of the statute, the court concluded that final 
completion and acceptance "requires the project to be at its end. That is, all of the work under 
the original project must be finished before 'final completion and acceptance' can occur." Id. at 
248. Similarly, this court should apply the plain language test to section 38-l-7(l)(b) and 
conclude that the time for a mechanic's lien claimant to record a mechanic's lien on a non-
residential project does not begin to run until all of the actions required by the original contract 
are finished. Because the McKell - Hustings - Eagle Pointe contract was not finally complete 
when McKell recorded its lien, McKell's lien was timely recorded. 
This court should strictly construe the phrase "final completion of the original contract." 
In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), this the 
court upheld the validity of a liquidated damages clause which imposed a $600.00 per day 
assessment if "any work shall remain" under the contract beyond the contract completion date. 
Id. at 1370. The court reviewed the plain language of the contract and concluded it authorized 
UDOT to assess liquidated damages until the project was finally complete, rejecting the 
performance bond surety's contention that liquidated damages could not be assessed after the 
project was substantially complete. The court wrote "The contract between the parties does not 
McKell is unaware of any legislative history pertaining to the language at issue here. 
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consider substantial completion; rather, it considers final completion as determined by the 
UDOT engineer. There is no ambiguity about this point. [The contractor] and UDOT could 
have easily included the term and concept of 'substantial performance' if they so intended." Id. 
InDecca Design Build, Inc. v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003) the Arizona Court of Appeals interpreted a statute of limitations in a subcontractor's 
performance bond requiring actions on the bond to filed "within two years of when the final 
payment under the subcontract comes due." Id. at 1252. The court used a dictionary definition 
of "final" to interpret the language of the performance bond and the subcontract, finding "[T]he 
meaning of 'final' is unambiguous. 'Final' means: 'not to be altered or undone being the last in 
a series, process or progress of or relating to the ultimate purpose or result of a process relating 
to or occurring at the end or conclusion.' " Id. at 1253 (citations omitted). Final payment was 
not due until final completion of the entire project, not just the subcontractor's work. Although 
the architect had issued a certificate of substantial completion, no certificate of final completion 
had been issued as required by contract. Consequently, the limitations period under the 
performance bond had not yet begun to run, and the contractor's action against the performance 
bond surety was timely, even though the subcontractor's work had been completed years before. 
In the present case, had the legislature wanted to start the time within which to record a lien on a 
non-residential project at any time other than upon the "final completion of the original 
contract," it would have done so, as it did for residences. The trial court should not, through a 
strained interpretation of section 38-l-7(l)(b), be allowed to do what the legislature specifically 
elected not to do. This court should reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
Judge Bohling committed reversible error when he interpreted section 38-l-7(l)(b) 
contrary to the plain language of the statute. The statute makes no mention of cessation, 
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abandonment or suspension of work as being synonymous with final completion. In fact, the 
legislature specifically deleted suspension of work as a triggering event for foreclosing a 
mechanic's lien when it amended section 38-1-11 in 1994. 1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) 
(deleting requirement for lien claimant to foreclose lien within twelve months after suspension of 
work for a period of at least 30 days). Judge Bohling's interpretation of section 38-l-7(l)(b) 
reinstates a concept Utah's Legislature specifically eliminated from the statute in 1994. Utah 
law prohibits a court from adopting an interpretation which rewrites a statute contrary to 
legislative intent. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650, 655. 
McKell's mechanic's lien recorded June 7, 2000, may properly impose a lien for work 
performed under the McKell - Husting Construction Agreement dated April 3, 1997, because the 
work was never finally completed and the project was not materially abandoned. "For priority of 
a mechanic's lien to relate back to the beginning of the work for which the lien is claimed, the 
work must all be a part of the same project; in other words, the work must have a continuity of 
purpose such that a reasonable observer of the site would be on notice that work was underway 
for which a lien could be claimed." Nu-Trend Elec, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Savs. & Loan Assoc 'n., 
786 P.2d 1369, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "The determination of what constitutes material 
abandonment is a factual issue." Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage 
Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (summary judgment remanded 
for a determination whether project was materially abandoned precluding architect's lien from 
relating back to visible work on site). The Ketchum court noted with approval that a project was 
not materially abandoned despite "a significant cessation of work.. .due to reasons not unheard of 
in construction - loss of financing, failure to get a bond, and state approval" when combined 
with the fact that "the project went ahead with little change in the original plans." Id., citing 
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Frank! Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780, 786 (Md. 1973). "In summary, what 
constitutes a 'material abandonment' sufficient to prevent relation back of mechanics' liens 
under section 38-1-5 is a complex inquiry. A court must examine the facts and make findings. 
A key concern is whether third parties would be on notice that work was continuing or, rather, 
would believe that work on the initial project had ceased." Id. at 1226. 
Hustings and Holmes entered into the Adjoining Subdivision Agreement so that both 
parcels could be developed. Hustings encountered difficulty in completing financing for the 
Project, and filed a Chapter 11 petition. Husting, while operating as a debtor-in-possession and 
under the supervision of a Trustee, continued to insist on developing the infrastructure for both 
parcels. Although the process was delayed, the Project proceeded "with little change in the 
original plans." Holmes knew the Trustee intended to continue performing under the Adjoining 
Subdivisions Agreement, and that work required under that document was, in fact provided to 
the Parkway Estates property by McKell under the initial contract with Husting, and under the 
replacement contract with Eagle Pointe. The nature and scope of the work was substantially the 
same over the duration of the Project, and although Holmes protested to the Trustee, Holmes 
apparently did not seek to restrain or enjoin McKell, the Trustee or Eagle Pointe from 
completing the improvements to the Parkway Estates property. At a minimum, genuine issues of 
material fact remain regarding the continuity of work and whether the Project was materially 
abandoned. Judge Bohling should have denied the motion for summary judgment due to the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact. This court should reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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II. Judge Bohling committed reversible error when he ruled that the existence of an 
express contract barred McKelPs quantum meruit claim against Holmes, as there is no 
express contract between McKell and Holmes. 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 12 
P.3d 580 (Utah 2000), the elements of which are: "(1) a benefit conferred on one person by 
another, (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit, and (3) the acceptance 
or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for 
the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value ... Thus, unjust enrichment is a 
claim between a conferor and a conferee." Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 WL 
22950137, *7 (Utah 2003) (citations omitted.) The general rule is that the existence of an 
express contract between a conferor and a conferee defeats the conferor's unjust enrichment 
claim. Five F, L.L.C v. Heritage Sav. Bank, 81 P.3d 105 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (directed verdict 
dismissing unjust enrichment claim affirmed; a deed of trust is an express contract providing 
legal remedies for breach); Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 19 P.3d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001) (summary judgment dismissing unjust enrichment claim affirmed; written Career Agent 
Contract between plaintiffs and defendant was an express contract governing the parties' 
relationship). There are numerous exceptions to the rule, motivated by the court's effort to 
fashion an equitable remedy based on the facts of each case. J &M Constr., Inc. v. Southam, 
722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986) (an express oral contract did not bar an unjust enrichment claim where 
the purpose of the contract was frustrated and defendants admittedly received the benefit of 
contractor's performance without tendering payment); Richards Contracting Co. v. Fullmer 
Bros., All P.2d 755 (Utah 1966) (the terms of a written contract requiring written authorization 
for extra work did not bar contractor's recovery in quantum meruit where the party seeking to 
enforce the contract verbally encouraged the contractor to perform extra work with the express or 
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implied promise to pay for such work); McCarren v. Merrill, 389 P.2d 732 (Utah 1962) (an 
express contract did not bar plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim where defendant abandoned the 
contract); accord, Parrish v. Tahtaras, 318 P.2d 642 (Utah 1957); Wilson v. Salt Lake City, \1A 
P. 847 (Utah 1918) (written contract did not bar contractor's unjust enrichment claim for work 
performed outside the contract under owner's direction); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 
421 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (while an enforceable written contract between plaintiff and defendant 
will typically bar plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment, a contract is not enforceable if not 
substantially performed). 
Absent an express contract between a contractor and owner, the contractor is entitled to 
recover on the quasi-contract theories of contract implied in fact or contract implied in law. 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, a third party who benefits from 
contractual performance is not liable under unjust enrichment theory absent circumstances 
showing that the third party's retention of the benefit without tendering payment is inequitable. 
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977); Knight v. Post, 
748 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Ultimately, "[w]hether a claimant has been unjustly 
enriched is a mixed question of law and fact." Desert Miriah, supra at 582; Groberg v. Housing 
Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Judge Bohling made no findings of fact in support of his ruling, but said "As to the issue 
of quantum meruit, I'm persuaded that the motion made by Mr. Badger is meritorious. I'm 
going to grant that motion. I don't believe that when there's a contract that you can come back 
and make a separate claim." Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment at 39. 
This court should reverse and remand for further proceedings because there is no dispute that 
there is no express contract between McKell, the conferor of the benefit, and Holmes, the 
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conferee of the benefit. While the existence of an express contract between the conferor and 
conferee of a benefit may bar a claim for unjust enrichment, Five F, L.L. C, supra, where there is 
no express contract, the confereor of the benefit may pursue an unjust enrichment claim against 
the conferee. Davies, supra. To the extent Judge Bohling was referring to the McKell - Husting 
- Eagle Pointe contract, this court should still reverse and remand because of the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact regarding McKell's unjust enrichment claim. 
This court should reverse Judge Bohling's ruling because genuine issues of material fact 
remain regarding McKell's unjust enrichment claim. The facts, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to McKell, show that McKell satisfied all of the elements of an unjust enrichment 
claim. First, McKell conferred a benefit upon Holmes by furnishing at least $132,824.18 in 
labor, services, equipment and materials to the Parkway Estates property in 1997 and 
subsequently installing road base, asphalt and curb and gutter to complete Galena Park 
Boulevard. McKell respectfully submits that absent this work, Holmes' conveyance of the 
property to Draper City is of little value. Second, Holmes clearly knew of and appreciated the 
benefit furnished by McKell. Holmes has previously acknowledged receiving a benefit under the 
Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement by virtue of McKell's performance. Husting acted as 
Holmes' agent under the Adjoining Subdivision Agreement for purposes of the infrastructure 
improvements to the Parkway Estates parcel, and as a matter of law, Holmes ratified Husting's 
contract with McKell. Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Adjoining 
Subdivision Agreement anticipated Holmes would pay its pro rata share of the cost of those 
improvements. The fact Holmes later elected to sell the property to Draper City as 
"unimproved" property reflects a business decision made by Holmes for which McKell should 
not be penalized. Holmes' decision to throw away the value of McKell's work based on a belief 
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the property was not suitable for development as a residential subdivision4 is a risk assumed by 
the developer, not McKell. Third, under the circumstances, McKell submits it is inequitable and 
unjust to allow Holmes to retain the benefit of McKell's work without payment. Under the 
Adjoining Subdivisions Agreement, Holmes was obligated to reimburse Husting for the value of 
improvements furnished by McKell to the Parkway Estates property. Holmes acknowledged 
Husting had the right to record a mechanic's lien to secure payment for the improvements 
furnished to Parkway Estates. Holmes never reimbursed either Husting or McKell, despite 
having specifically directed McKell as to the location of water and sewer stub-ins for Parkway 
Estates lots accessed off Galena Park Boulevard. McKell had direct dealings with Holmes, and 
was assured Castle Homes was taking over the project and would pay for McKell's work on the 
Parkway Estates property. Finally, after McKell installed the improvements, Holmes then 
elected to sell the property to Draper City, a voluntary decision which is now asserted as 
justification to deprive McKell of its equitable remedy. These facts, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to McKell, are sufficient to support a claim for unjust enrichment. This court 
should reverse and remand for further proceedings on McKell's unjust enrichment claim. 
III. Judge Bohling abused his discretion in evaluating Holmes' request for fees because 
he did not evaluate the request consistent with Utah law; Holmes was only entitled to an 
award of fees related to its defense of McKell's mechanic's lien claim, Holmes did not meet 
its evidentiary burden to support such an award, and the fees incurred were unreasonable. 
Holmes sued on three theories: 1) to remove McKell's mechanic's lien; 2) for slander of 
title; and 3) for tortious interference with prospective economic relations. Holmes subsequently 
moved for summary judgment on McKell's claim to enforce the mechanic's lien, and on 
McKell's unjust enrichment claim. Judge Bohling granted the motion, ruling the lien was not 
4
 Holmes' position is curious in light of the fact lots were sold and homes constructed in the 
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timely recorded and that the existence of an express contract precluded the unjust enrichment 
claim. Holmes sought its attorney's fees pursuant to section 38-1-18 of Utah's mechanic's lien 
statute which authorizes the successful party to recover a reasonable fee. Holmes initially 
submitted a request for fees of $30,447 (164 hours of work) and requested the court to award the 
entire amount5, not just the portion attributable to defeating McKell's mechanic's lien claim. 
After considering the complexity of the case, the experience, competence and efficiency of 
counsel, the reasonableness of the hourly rates and whether there was duplication of effort 
between Holmes' two attorneys, Judge Bohling awarded $25,000 in fees. Transcript of Hearing 
on Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees at 12-14. "What I'm going to do is make an adjustment 
based on my own sense that there's always a little inefficiency and when there are two lawyers 
involved, there's going to be perhaps a little more." Id. at 13. 
Utah courts have broad discretion in determining the reasonableness of a fee, Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 164 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), but attorney's fee awards must be based on 
evidence in the record. Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). While the moving party may file 
supporting affidavits, the court need not accept self-serving testimony, and should instead base 
its determination on specific factors to determine the reasonableness of the award. Govert at 
173. The court must justify the award on the record and enumerate the factors considered in 
reaching its conclusion. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Factors used to evaluate the reasonableness of a request for award of attorney's fees are 
Galena Hills subdivision. (Record 316, f 9). 
5
 Holmes' application for fees did not include fees incurred in preparing the complaint, and fees 
incurred in evaluating whether to proceed on Holmes' remaining claims for relief after the court 
granted Holmes' motion for summary judgment. With these exceptions, the application for fees 
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the difficulty of the litigation; the efficiency of the attorney presenting the case; the number of 
hours billed; the customary amount of fees charged; the amount at issue and the result obtained; 
and the expertise of the attorneys involved. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1995). 
As an initial matter, Holmes had the burden of presenting evidence supporting its 
requested award, Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), and was only entitled to the 
reasonable fee incurred in defeating McKell's mechanic's lien claim; there was no other basis for 
an award of fees in this case. Kurth v. Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Attorney's 
fees may only be awarded for those fees incurred that are directly related to the mechanic's lien 
claim, unless there are other overlapping claims. Id. at 1116. A claim overlaps if it is closely 
related and requires the same proof of facts as the primary claim. Brown v. David Richards & 
Co., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "[A] party seeking fees must allocate its fee request 
according to its underlying claims," that is, "successful claims for which there may be an 
entitlement to attorney's fees ... unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an 
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful... and claims for which there is no 
entitlement to fees." Foote at 55 (citations omitted). "The court must make an independent 
evaluation of the reasonableness of the fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions," and 
must "document its evaluation of the requested fees' reasonableness through findings of fact" 
which "mirror the requesting party's allocation of fees" and "detail the factors considered 
dispositive ... in calculating the award." Id. (citations omitted). Failure to evaluate a request for 
attorney's fees in the manner required by Utah law constitutes an abuse of discretion. Foote, 
supra. 
included all of the time incurred on this case. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees at 7-8. 
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Judge Bohling abused his discretion in evaluating Holmes' request for fees because he 
did not evaluate the request consistent with Utah law. Holmes' request for fees should have been 
denied in its entirety because Holmes failed to meet its evidentiary burden to support the request. 
Holmes' failure to allocate fees between recoverable claims and non-recoverable claim is fatal. 
Judge Bohling made no attempt to apportion the fees attributable to the lien claim and those 
attributable to the remaining claims. But Judge Bohling was not assisted in his task by Holmes, 
who made no attempt to segregate fees according to claims. This defect alone would have 
justified denying the request. Id. at 57 citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
Holmes argued that its failure to allocate should be ignored because of the interrelated 
nature of the claims and because it submitted counsel's billing records. But, this approach is 
acceptable only if the claims are so complicated and intertwined that work on one claim cannot 
be segregated from work on the other claims. Winters v. Schulman, 2001 WL 357124 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2001) (unpublished); Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). Holmes' claims are not so complicated as to prevent it from at least attempting to 
segregate fees according to the various claims, but this it did not do, relying instead on counsel's 
billing records as a substitute for allocating fees. The submittal of billing records alone is not a 
substitute for allocating fees. An allocation of fees is sufficient "if the substance of the process 
results in separating recoverable from non recoverable fees." Keith Jorgensen 's Inc. v. Ogden 
City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In Jorgensen, the court ruled that the 
submission of billing records, with testimony at an evidentiary hearing on fees and a proffer of 
records, all accompanied by a memorandum, sufficiently allocated fees between recoverable and 
non-recoverable claims. No such process was followed in this case. In Dejavue, the court found 
an award of attorney's fees memorialized in the trial court's written findings of fact was 
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supported by the evidentiary record consisting of billing records accompanied by three expert 
affidavits from local attorney's specializing in civil litigation attesting to the reasonableness and 
necessity of the request. No such process was followed in this case. "Nothing in the record 
indicates that the trial court performed an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
requested fees. The trial court did not enter any findings of fact setting forth the steps of its 
evaluation or supporting its fee award." Foote at 56. Consequently, the court should reverse and 
remand. 
Holmes is not entitled to an award of $25,000 because those fees remain unreasonable 
when the factors typically considered in evaluating a fee request are applied to Holmes' request. 
See, Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1995). For example, the difficulty of the 
litigation does not support an award of fees on the order of magnitude granted by Judge Bohling. 
Holmes' records show counsel spent only 1.9 hours researching the motion for summary 
judgment, and counsel was intimately familiar with the facts of the case due to extensive 
involvement in the bankruptcy proceedings which preceded the filing of Holmes' complaint. 
Although Judge Bohling arbitrarily adjusted Holmes' fees for perceived inefficiency, McKell 
submits the adjustment was insufficient in light of the hours billed. Holmes billed a total of 164 
hours, a number which McKell suggests is excessive for the issues in this case. Counsel spent 
almost 9 hours on initial disclosures, 28 hours on interrogatories and request to produce 
documents, 96 hours researching, drafting revising and arguing the motion for summary 
judgment (32 hours drafting, 38.7 hours reviewing and revising, 6.2 hours discussing the motion 
among counsel, and 1.9 hours researching the issues). Further, the motion was drafted over eight 
months, inviting inefficiency. In light of the above, Judge Bohling should have dramatically 
pared down Holmes' request, but did not. The fees awarded remain unreasonable, the difficulty 
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of the litigation did not support an award of fees of $25,000, and counsel was inefficient in the 
work which was accomplished. This court should reverse and remand. 
CONCLUSION 
McKell respectfully requests the court to reverse Judge Bohling and to remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM 
38-1-7 Notice of claim -Contents —Recording —Service on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of 
the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project 
or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Section 38-
11-102. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom the lien claimant was employed or to whom the lien 
claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; 
(f) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of 
Documents; and 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement 
describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien 
claimant to remove the lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is not required for any 
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(4) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: 
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien claimant, the copy of 
the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and 
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the 
affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes 
the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record 
owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing the 
form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h). 
a 
38-1-11 Enforcement -Time for -Lis pendens -Action for debt not affected -Instructions and 
form affidavit and motion. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within: 
(a) 12 months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence 
as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for 
record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the 
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the 
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show 
actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the 
same. 
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a 
residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the 
complaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the residence to 
specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the motion for summary 
judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after the service of the summons and complaint upon 
the nonpaying party, as defined in Section 38-11-102, and the time for the nonpaying party to 
respond, as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, has elapsed. 
(c) The instructions and form affidavit and motion required by Subsection (4)(a) shall meet the 
requirements established by rule by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(d) If the nonpaying party, as defined by Section 38-11-102, files for bankruptcy protection and 
there is a bankruptcy stay in effect, the motion for summary judgment and the action to enforce 
the lien shall be stayed until resolution of the related claim under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and form 
affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or 
enforcing the lien upon the residence. 
b 
Prior Versions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11 
Version effective from April 24, 1989 to May 2, 1994: 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property. 
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 days after 
substantial completion of the project or improvement shall file for record with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written 
notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or 
material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3. No acknowledgment or certificate is required 
for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim 
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for-Lis pendens-Action for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun within twelve months after the 
completion of the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty 
days. Within the twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record with the 
county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real property, 
or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action and the burden of proof 
shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show such actual knowledge. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a 
debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to 
recover the same. 
c 
Version effective May 2, 1994 
1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) 
Ch. 308 
S.B. No. 87 
REAL PROPERTY-MECHANICS' LIENS-RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTION AND LIEN 
RECOVERY 
FUND ACT 
38-1-7. Notice of claim-Contents-Recording-Service on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall within 90 days from the date the person 
last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or 
improvement file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, or 
some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or 
material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment 
or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim 
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within: 
(a) twelve months from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last 
furnished equipment or material on an original contract not involving a residence as defined in 
Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2)(a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for 
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record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the 
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the 
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show 
actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the 
same. 
e 
Version effective May 1, 1995 
1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) 
Ch. 172 
S.B. No. 115 
LIENS-RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTIONS-LIEN RECOVERY FUND 
Section 1. Section 38-1-7 is amended to read: 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents-Recording-Service on owner of property 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of 
the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date; 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project 
or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Section 38-
11-102. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or 
material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment 
or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim 
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for-Lis pendens-Action for debt not affected 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within: 
(a) twelve months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a 
residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
f 
(2)(a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for 
record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the 
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the 
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show 
actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the 
same. 
g 
AFFIDAVIT OF LESLIE McLEAN 
h 
AFFIDAVIT OF LESLIE MCLEAN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW your affiant, Leslie McLean, who deposes and states that 
1. I am a legislative aide for the Utah State Senate. 
2. As a legislative aide, it is my duty to assist in the custodial tasks associated with 
the records containing the floor debates and discussions of the Utah State Senate. 
3. The following, in pertinent part, is a true and authentic verbatim record of the 
discussion of Senate Bill 87 which occurred in the Senate during the fiftieth general legislative 
session on February 3, 1994, as recorded on Tape No. 16 in the Senate office: 
Senator Howell: . . . For the last thirty-six months, literally thirty-six months, Fve 
been working to try and come up with a solution to a problem that 
continues to happen in the state of Utah. When you look at our 
gross, uh, uh, nat—, uh, gross state product, about fourteen 
percent, fourteen-and-a-half percent of that comes through 
construction. Primarily that's in the residential arena. It's 
projected in 1995 that that will double to almost twenty-five 
percent of our gross product here. SB 87 is a consumer bill that is 
designed to protect homeowners from mechanics liens being filed 
against their homes where the homeowner has already paid for the 
work. Without this protection, our existing law subjects the 
homeowner to liability to pay not once, but twice, for the work. 
Besides protecting the consumers, a lien recovery fund will be 
created in which subcontractors, suppliers, and laborers may file 
claims for payment for their work where the general contractor has 
failed to pay or— pay for them after having been paid by the 
homeowner... . 
* * * 
Senator Oakey: . . . A question has come up as to how the suppliers and 
subcontractors will know that the requirements for accessing the 
fund have been met by the owner. That is, having a written 
contract, a building permit, and, uh, using a licensed contractor. 
How will they know that so that they will know that they are 
entitled to file their claim against the fund? 
* * * 
Attorney John Young: . . . The subcontractor would merely proceed as they do now under 
existing law. They would attempt to file a lien against the home. 
It would then be incumbent upon the homeowner to come forward 
to the subcontractor and demonstrate affirmatively that the con— 
that the homeowner had entered into a written contract with a 
licensed contractor, and that the homeowner had indeed paid in full 
the amount required of the homeowner under the contract. And if 
the work that was being performed was, uh, required a building 
permit in the particular, uh, locale that was involved, that a 
building permit had also been issued. If the homeowner meets 
those four requirements, then the homeowner has protection from 
being, having a mechanic's lien against their home or being sued 
personally for any additional amounts due so that they don't pay 
twice. That, by doing that, by providing that information to the 
subcontractor or supplier, they are then able to go forward as 
against the general contractor. 
Senator Oakey: Alright, I think I understand your answer. Let me just follow up 
with a couple of additional questions. That would mean that the 
homeowner would have to present to the supplier or the 
subcontractor the, uh, uh, evidence— show him the written 
contract, that there was a written contract. Show him a copy of the 
building permit which the owner would have. And also, show him 
that the contractor was licensed. Now does the contractor have to 
be licensed at the time the written contract is signed? Is that 
the point in time when his license has to be in effect? 
Attorney John Young: Well, I believe that's true under existing law, Senator. We did not 
address that particular issue in this proposal, but I think that's 
the— 
Senator Oakey: How does he show that the contractor is licensed? Does he have to 
get some certificate from the licensing bureau, agency, to show 
that, or I mean how does he prove that? 
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Attorney John Young: 
Senator Oakey: 
Attorney John Young: 
Senator Oakey: 
Yes. You can go down to the department of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing and get a certificate from that department, 
uh, indicating the status and condition of any contractor's license 
in the state. 




* * * 
Senator Beattie: 
Attorney John Young: 
On the $75,000 amount, was that discussed about— I don't know 
what the average lien is, uh, on these issues. I know that there are 
several, that once you get a bad apple it seems like there are a 
whole bunch on one house, that, that seems to be the problem. 
But, but, the average lien by a particular subcontractor or supplier, 
is much smaller than $75,000. 
Yes. The, the discussion that was held with respect to the $75,000 
cap was essentially that in most instances, uh, the problems tend to 
occur during the latter part of the construction of any given project. 
The contractor is doing fine halfway through the work he's paying 
his bills. As you start nearing completion, the contractor has either 
failed to bid the job properly or is getting strapped on other 
projects. So it's in that last half of the project that things start to 
happen.... 
* * * 
Senator Beattie: My point, and somebody just came down, Senator Howell 
mentioned to me that the someone thought that the average lien 
was about $2500. So in reality this bill should take care of the 
majority of the, uh, liens. 
* * * 
Senator Howell: Mr. President, I'd sum up by, uh, telling you that I believe this bill 
will finally provide a means for, uh, and protection for the 
3 
homeowners, subcontractors, and, most importantly, from 
unscrupulous contractors who take advantage of their most 
important resource and those are the consumers. I'd urge your 
support on it 
DATED this /ffi^ifayof ,':/"'fabli- . 1997. 
^/*:WyCv; 
Leslie McLean 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ £ ^ L day of ^/^M^A^ 1997. 
^/tofSjffir ^ ^ f a ^ s 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ANNETTE B. MOORE 
319 State Capitol 
Salt Uka City, Utah 64114 
4Mtft,2000 
STATE OF UTAM„ 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
l 
Douglas J. Payne, A4113 
P. Bruce Badger, A4791 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, ] 
INC., a Utah corporation and COULTER ] 
& SMITH, LTD., a Nevada corporation, ) 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
R.A. McKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a ; 
Utah corporation and RICK McKELL, an ~ 
individual, 
Defendants. 
1 FINAL JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 000909210 
) Judge William J. Bohling 
Plaintiffs John Holmes Construction, Inc. and Coulter & Smith, Ltd., are collectively 
awarded judgment in their favor and against Defendant R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc., 165 N. 
1330 West, Suite Bl, Orem, Utah 84057, in the amount of $25,000 as an award of their 
reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. This Judgment shall bear 
interest from the date hereof at the statutory rate. 
IfifiArs r—*. F I L i i rammer CGttfiT 
By 
AUG 0 5 2003 
SALT ^AKB^OUNTY 
Dsputy CJsrk 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
Further, R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc.'s Notice of Claim of Lien recorded in the official 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah, on June 7, 2000, as Entry 7654861, 
Book 8366, Pages 6121-6122, with respect to Parcels # 27-25-351-017, 27-25-351-024 and 27-
25-376-002, as more fully described in Exhibit A hereto, is hereby released. The Lis Pendens 
recorded in the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 13, 2002, as 
Entry 8352958, Book 8648, Pages 878-880, with respect to Parcels # 27-25-351-017, 27-25-351-
024 and 27-25-376-002, as more folly described in Exhibit B hereto, is also hereby released. 
A certified copy of this Final Judgment may be recorded in the official records of 
the Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with respect to Parcels # 27-25-351-017, 
27-25-351-024 and 27-25-376-002, as more fully described in Exhibits A and B hereto. 
DATED this A_ day of £ & M J L W , 2003. 1H 
BY THE COURT: 
V , 
^ " - " - ^ / • ; & & * * • 
i)lX^U^i%'c( 
; * i i i . Honorable William J. B^Mag^"^- ' 
Third District Court N ^ S ^ ^ M 
^ f e ^ x * * A tiffs'* 
Approved as to form: 
ack W. Reed 
Peterson Reed LLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
J 
Douglas J. Payne, A4113 
P. Bruce Badger, A4791 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, ) 
INC., a Utah corporation and COULTER ) 
& SMITH, LTD., a Nevada corporation, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ] 
R.A. McKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a ; 
Utah corporation and RICK McKELL, an ] 
individual, ] 
Defendants. 
I ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
1 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 000909210 
) Judge William J. Bohling 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the 
Honorable William Bohling, on August 12, 2002 at 10:30 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by P. 
Bruce Badger. Defendants were represented by Jack W. Reed. The court, having considered the 
parties' moving papers, and having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully 
advised, determines that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Plaintiffs are 
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the court concludes as a 
FILED DISTRBCT CGBfiT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 0 3 2002 
SALT LAh 
'-EL 
Deputy ClerK ' 
matter of law that Defendants failed to record the Notice of Claim of Lien within the time period 
set forth in Utah Code Ann.§ 38-l-7(l)(a) and (b) and that Defendants' quantum meruit claim 
fails as a matter of law because of the existence of an express contract. Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
Defendants' Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice for no cause of action and R.A. 
McKell Excavating, Inc.'s Notice of Claim of Lien is hereby declared to be null and void. 
At such time as all of the remaining claims against the Defendants have been finally and 
fully adjudicated, Plaintiff shall be entitled to an order that may be recorded in the records of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder which releases the Notice of Claim of Lien recorded on June 7, 2000, 
as Entry 7654861, Book 8366, Pages 6121-6122, in the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, State of Utah. 
DATED this °j day of Q'CAfAA\ 2 0 0 2 ' 
BY THE COURT: 
William J. Bohling 
Third District Court 
Approved as to form: 
Jack W. Reed 
PETERSEN REED, LLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the -^//-~ day of September, 2002,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by hand delivering said document as follows: 
Jack W. Reed 
Jerald V. Hale 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
k 
If\*/* 
Douglas J. Payne, A4113 
P. Bruce Badger, A4791 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
By 
ILED SESTRICT-SGtiK 
Third J-idic'*.! District 
AUG 0 5 2003 
SALT LAKE C ^ j ^ > -
T ^ * Deputy Ofsrk 
RAMCKELLEXCAV J D 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN HOLMES CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation and COULTER 
& SMITH, LTD., a Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R.A. McKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a 
Utah corporation and RICK McKELL, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 000909210 
Judge William J. Bohling 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees came on for hearing before the Honorable 
William J. Bohling on July 14, 2003, at 10:15 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by P. Bruce 
Badger and Douglas J. Payne of Fabian & Clendenin. Defendants were represented by Jack W. 
Reed of Peterson Reed, LLC. 
Plaintiffs are, by virtue of the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, dated October 
9, 2002, the successful parties in this action to enforce a mechanic's lien under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-1 et. seq., and are, therefore, entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. 
The court has considered the respective motion papers in favor of and opposing an award 
of attorneys' fees, including the Joint Affidavit of P. Bruce Badger and Douglas J. Payne In 
Support Of Motion For Award Of Attorneys' Fees, and has heard argument of counsel, and has 
reviewed the record in this case including plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
related papers. The court finds that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment presented 
complex issues relating to defendant's mechanic's lien. The court further finds that plaintiffs' 
counsel are experienced lawyers and that their hourly rates are justified based on their years in 
practice, their reputations, and the customary rates in the community, but that there was some 
duplication of effort. Based on these findings and the amount at issue and the result obtained, the 
court finds that $25,000 (not $30,447.00 sought by plaintiffs) is a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees is 
granted. Plaintiffs are collectively entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$25,000, which shall be reflected in a separate Final Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against 
defendant R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc.. 
DATED this S~ day of (^iXAkuX , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable William J. 
Third District Court 
Approved as to form: 
ack W. Reed 
Peterson Reed LLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ADJOINING SUBDIVISION AGREEMENT 
1 
on 4.0 (March 5, 1996) 
ADJOINING SUBDIVISIONS AGREEMENT 
^ day of /ft&rcA This Agreement is made this o "  . _ 1996, by and betwe 
High Country Apache Builders, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and Husting Land and 
Development, a Utah Corporation (herein jointly and severally referred as WHLD/Apache 
Builders"); and John Holmes Construction, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and Mesa 
Development, Inc., a Utah Corporation (herein jointly and severally referred as 
"Holmes/Mesa"). 
RECITALS 
A. HLD/Apache Builders are contracting to purchase real property located in 
Draper, Utah, known as the Proposed Galena Hills Subdivision ("Galena"). The present 
design of Galena is shown on Exhibit "A". 
B. Holmes/Mesa owns real property in Draper, Utah, known as the Proposed 
Parkway Estate Subdivision ("Parkway"). The present design of Parkway is shown on 
C. Galena and Parkway are adjoining properties as shown, Exhibit "AM. 
D. There are aspects of the development of each subdivision that are common to 
and shared by both Galena and Parkway. These common characteristics include contribution 
and development of common areas, installation of utilities to the benefit of both subdivisions, 
and development of common roadways. 
E. As a condition to recording and approval of either subdivision, Draper City 
has required that both parties jointly pay to Draper City an "Impact Fee" in the amount of 
$60,000.00 to be used by Draper City for the development of the common area.. 
F. By this Agreement, the parties intend to agree upon the allocation of costs and 
resDonsibiiities associated with these matters of common concern. 
AGREEMENT 
Based on the foregoing recitals, HLD/Apache Builders and Holmes/Mesa mutually 
agree, covenant and represent as follows: 
1. Dedication of Land for Common Areas. As a condition for approval of 
Galena and Parkway, Draper City is requiring that both parties collectively contribute 
1 
approximately ten acres of adjoining land to be used and developed by Draper Ciry for public 
use, Tne land to be dedicated by HLD/Apache Builders is shown in green on Exhibit "A". 
The land to be dedicaied by Holmes/Mesa is shown in blue on Exhibit "A". Said parcels are 
more particularly described on the final plats which have been given final approval by the 
City of Draper. 
2. Joint Development Projects and Division of Costs. 
(a) 50/50 Projects. The following costs shall be borne equally by HLD/Apacht 
and Holmes/Mesa: 
(i) Sewer Line. The sewer line which shall be installed from the trunk 
line across county land within a 15 foot easement granted by the 
County and shall cross into the Galena Subdivision at the apex of the 
back lot line of Lot 316 (*Connection Point"). For the purpose of 
servicing Parkway Estates, the sewer line shall be installed along the 
back lot lines of Lots 316, 317, 318 and 319 of Galena to the point 
adjoining Lot 217 Parkway; and thence along the West line of Lot 217 
Parkway to and along the boundary line between Lots 221 and 222 of 
Parkway Estates to a manhole to be located near the center of a street 
to be known as Zion Park Court. For the purpose of servicing Galena 
hills, the line shall be installed from the Connection Point South along 
the back lines of Lots 316, 315, 314, 214 and 213 of Galena hills and 
running thence along an easement between Lots 212 and 213 of Galena 
Hills to a manhole in Webb Road. This sewer line is partially shown 
in red on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. Holmes/Mesa shall not be 
bound by any contract for the installation of this sewer main, in excess 
of 5100,000.00 without their written approval. 
(ii) Entrance, Entrance landscaping, improvements, and signage at Lie 
intersection of Galena Park Boulevard and 12300 South Street as latex 
agreed by the parties. 
(b) 65/35 Projects. The costs of the following projects shall be borne as follows: 
Sixty-five percent (65%) of by HLD/Apache Builders and thirty-five (35%) by 
Holmes/Mesa: 
(i) Impact Fee. Payment of the S60,000.00 Impact Fee to Draper City 
shall be split on a 65 %/35% basis with HLD/Apache Builders paying 
$39,000, and Holmes/Mesa paying the remaining $21,000. 
(ii) Improvements to Common Areas. The cost of improvements to 
common areas including private 20-foot lane from Galena Park 
Boulevard and running East 262 feet along the south line of Smekens 
and L.L.W. Property (shown on Exhibit "AM), utility stubs, fencing 
along railroad tracks, re-routing of irrigation system within the common 
area and under Galena Park Boulevard to the West line of said street 
and such and such other improvements as may be required by Drape: 
^ * f < \ 
City and agreed upon by the parties shall also be shared on the same 
65%I35% basis. Each party shall be responsible for the costs involved 
with its own irrigation system pertaining to the respective subdivisions. 
Galena Park Boulevard. Because Galena Park Boulevard services and 
benefits both subdivisions, the parties agree to split the following costs 
on a 65%/35%. HLD/Apache shall pay 65% and Holmes/Mesa shall 
pay 35 % of the following costs associated with the common entrance 
portion of Galena Park Boulevard: 
(A) The full cost of the land, surface and underground 
improvements for curb, gutter, sidewalk, excavation, asphalt, 
electric power, gas, telephone, and TV cables and storm drain 
on both sides of Galena Park Boulevard from 12300 South 
Street to the North line (extended) of Lot 36 Parkway; and 
(B) The full cost of the land and surface and underground 
improvements for only the Bast one-half (1/2) of Galena Park 
Boulevard along the frontage of the common area South from 
said North line of Lot 36, to the North lot line of Lot 1 
Parkway; and 
(C) One-half the cost of the sewer, water and utility stubs from 
12300 South Street to the North lot line of Lot 1 Parkway; 
(D) That portion of Galena Park Boulevard which is subject to this 
provision is shown on Exhibit "A" in orange. The cost of the 
land shall be calculated to include the following: (1) The 
Smekens land shall be included at actual cost (presently 
projected to be $7,500.00); and the other land shail be based on 
a cost of $23,500.00 per acre. The estimated cost is 
590,000.00. 
(E) Except for the items referred to above, Holmes/Mesa shall be 
responsible to reimburse HLD/Apache for the actual costs for 
the development of all other portions of Galena Park Boulevard 
situated within the Parkway Subdivision, including the surface 
and subsurface improvements. The estimated cost for these 
improvements is $200,000.00. Holmes/Mesa shall not be 
responsible for any reimbursement in excess of this amount 
without their written approval. 
Improvements to 12300 South Street. Improvements at 12300 South 
Street as required by Draper City and UDOT to include removal of 
trees, relocation of utility poles, lines and water meters, removal of 
shed and concrete pad, widening of the pavement, installation of fence, 
and installation of curb, gutter and sidewalks on the south side of the 
road shall be paid 65% by HLD/Apache Builders and 35% by 
Holmes/Mesa. Holmes/Mesa shall not be bound by any contract in 
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txczss of 5135,000.00 for these improvements, together with any other 
improvements subsequently required by Draper City" and/or UDOT 
without their written approval. Holmes/Mesa shall not be responsible 
for reimbursement for any improvements subsequently required by 
Draper City and/or UDOT subsequent to this agreement without their 
written approval. 
(v) Galena Canal and Storm Drain Line. Any alterations and/or 
improvements to Galena Canal and any storm drain line(s) from Galena 
Canal to Jordan River Canal may be required by Draper City shall be 
paid 65% by HLD/Apache Builders and 35% by Holmes/Mesa. It is 
anticipated that this work may not be required by Draper City. The 
maximum estimated cost for such work, if required, is 525,000.00. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Holmes/Mesa shall not be responsible 
for reimbursement for any such improvements required by Draper City 
and/or UDOT subsequent to this agreement without their written 
approval. 
3. Contracting for the Performance of the Work. 
(a) Bidding Process Generally. HLD/Apache Builders shall obtain a minimum of 
three (3) bids from outside/independent contractors for each of the projects and 
work described in this Agreement. The bid award(s) shall be approved* in 
writing by Holmes/Mesa taking into account the amount of each bid, 
availability to commence work, quality and other relevant factors. Said 
approval shall be evidenced by execution of a Contract Ratification Form 
completed substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Either 
HLD/Apache or Holmes/Mesa may bid on any portion of the work. Any or 
all bids which exceed the amount of the estimates given herein may be rejected 
by Holmes/Mesa at their option, based on cost alone. 
(b) Galena Park and 12300 South. The development of Galena Park Boulevard 
and the joint improvements contemplated by this Agreement to both Galena 
Park Boulevard and 12300 South are to be bid separately from the other work 
contemplated by this Agreement or connected with either subdivision. 
(c) Responsibility for Off site Improvements, 
(i) HLD/Apache Builders shall be responsible to award, bond and 
complete in a timely manner the work as referred to herein. 
(ii) Delays in construction caused by factors beyond the control of 
HLD/Apache Builders shall extend the deadlines set forth herein. 
4 
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Standards/Specifications. 
(i) All bids and all work shall be completed in accordance with the plans 
and specifications prepared by Neff Engineering in a workmanlike 
fashion and in a manner acceptable to Draper City; 
(ii) HLD/Apache shall be responsible to install the sewer lines, water lines 
and other utilities that service Parkway Subdivision from or through 
Galena Park Boulevard, including the underground utilities, pipe, 
structural fill, irrigation line and subsurface drain pipe etc. together 
with all surface improvements, including roadbase, curb, gutter and 
finish asphalt for the completion of Galena Park Boulevard. Further, 
the side roads extending from Galena Park Boulevard (proposed Hyde 
Court, Wilkens Court and Kolob Way) shall be completed and extended 
out from Galena Park Boulevard at least past the end of the radius of 
the curb and gutter for each of said side streets. 
(iii) HLD/Apache shall be responsible to install the sewer laterals and all 
other underground utilities which are to be installed within Galena Park 
Boulevard in such a manner that the utilities hook-ups for each of the 
lots shall be well within the lot to a point at least 5 feet beyond the 
edge of the sidewalk furthest from the street for each lot abutting the 
street so that the streets and sidewalks will not have to be torn up when 
the utilities are connected to the new home constructed on each of said 
lots. HLD/Apache warrants that no portion of the streets and 
sidewalks, once installed, will have to be torn up or re-installed in 
order to make the connections for utilities in connection with the 
construction of a home on any lot along said street. 
(iv) HLD/Apache and all of its contractors performing any contract shall be 
duiy licensed with the State of Utah and shall maintain adequate 
liability insurance reasonably acceptable to Holmes/Mesa. 
Estimates. Holmes/Mesa and HLD/Apache has prepared estimate/target 
amounts for various aspects of the joint development work. Further, 
HLD/Apache has obtained actual written bids with respect to said work. A 
schedule of these amounts is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" entitled Contract 
Estimates. The parties accept and agree to said amounts and agree that 
Holmes/Mesa shall not be bound to make reimbursement on any separate 
contract in any amount which exceeds the target/estimate amount as set forth 
on said Exhibit for said work. 
Payment of Advances. Holmes/Mesa shall reimburse HLD/Apache Builders 
the amount of Holmes/Mesa's pro-rata share of the development work as 
provided in this Agreement (herein referred to as the Holmes/Mesa 
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reimbursement.) The parties acknowledge that HLD/Apache shall have lien 
rights on the first phase of Parkway Estates Subdivision whicfh shall secure the 
payments owed from Holmes/Mesa to HLD/Apache hereunder for the 
improvements szt forth herein. HLD/Apache shall, at the request of 
Holmes/Mesa, execute and deliver to Holmes/Mesa: 
(i) Subordination Agreement(s) from HLD/Apache and all of its 
Contractors and Subcontractors, satisfactory to Holmes/Mesa, by which 
HLD/Apache and its Contractors and Subcontractors subordinate their 
lien rights to a development loan made by Holmes/Mesa on the 
Parkway Property or any phase thereof in an amount not to exczzd 
51,000,000.00. 
(ii) Satisfactory partial lien releases on any lot(s) upon receipt of partial 
payments from Holmes/Mesa to HLD/Apache Builders in an amount 
calculated by dividing the balance due to HLD/Apache Builders for the 
Holmes/Mesa reimbursement by the number of lots remaining in Phase 
One of Parkway Estates Subdivision. The partial lot release payment to 
be paid by Holmes/Mesa shall be paid at the time a building permit is 
issued on that lot in Phase One of Parkway. In any event, the entire 
remaining balance of the Holmes/Mesa Reimbursement shall be due and 
payable (subject to offsets for warranty work as set forth below) not 
later than twenty-four (24) months after final inspection and acceptance 
of the work by the appropriate governmental agency and upon 
completion of the performance of all other obligations of HLD/Apache 
Builders under this Agreement. 
(iii) HLD/Apache Builders shall warrant to Holmes/Mesa all work required 
to be performed by HLD/Apache Builders under this Agreement for the 
period extending through the time that HLD/Apache Builders is entitled 
to reimbursement from Holmes/Mesa under this agreement. 
(iv) HLD/Apache Builder shall provide such lien waivers and lien releases 
from all parties with lien rights, including partial lien waivers and 
releases which shall be executed by HLD/Apache, all contractors, sub-
contractors, laborers and suppliers for all lienable services, labor and 
materials furnished on the Parkway properry. Further, HLD/Apache 
shall similarly cause to be delivered to Holmes/Mesa one or more full 
and final lien releases and waivers from all of the foregoing at such 
time as HLD/Apache receives a Trust Deed from Holmes/Mesa or its 
successor or assignee hereunder securing the obligation for the 
payments set forth herein. 
(v) At or before the time of its request for reimbursement from 
Holmes/Mesa for any contract work under this agreement, 
HLD/Apache shall furnish to Holmes/Mesa a copy of the contrac: 
ratification form referred to above duly executed by Holmes/Mesa and 
HLD/Apache approving each contract upon which reimbursement is 
requested. Holmes/Mesa shall in no wise be responsible for any 
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reimbursement not pre-approved on the appropriate form, 
HLD/Apache agrees to have each of its contractors and subcontractors who 
perform any work on the property connected with the Parkway Property dulv 
executed an Affidavit in the form attached hereto as Exhibit T n . Each of said 
affidavits shall be duly executed, notarized and delivered to Meridian Title 
Company prior to commencing any work provided for under this Agreement. 
Protective Easement. Any recoupment of costs by virtue of a protective strip 
(if permitted by Draper City) from adjoining landowners or developers shall be* 
HLD/Apache Builders and 45% to Holmes/Mesa. 
Procedure for Payment of Shared Costs to Draper City. 
Impact Fee. Each party shall pay its share of the Impact Fee directly to and is 
required by Di .per City. 
Storm Drainage Fees. Each party will pay its pro-rata share of the Storm 
Drainage fees for Galena Park Boulevard due to Draper on the same basis as 
the costs of the improvements are allocated. Said storm drain fees are to be 
paid directly to and as required by Draper City. 
Dedication of Galena Park Boulevard. 
H-' :.mes/Mesa shall deliver to Meridian Title Company in escrow a deed 
dedicating the land included within Galena Park Boulevard to Draper Cicy 
which shall include the property within the perimeter description of Galena 
park Boulevard from 12300 South Street to the North line of the proposed 
Galena Subdivision. The form of said deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" 
and shall be subject to existing liens of record. The parties shall deliver to 
Meridian the following: 
(i) An executed original of this Agreement; 
(ii) Holmes/Mesa shall deliver the duly executed original of the Dedication 
Deed of Galena Park boulevard; 
(iii) HLD/Apache Builders shall execute and deliver to Meridian in escrow 
a duly executed and recordable release/abandonment of the original 50 
foot Easement from 12300 South Street to and over any portion of the 
Holmes/Mesa property (not including any portion of Galena Park 
Boulevard); 
(iv) HLD/Apache Builders shall deliver to Meridian its Warranty Deed to 
One Acre of the Webb parcel as set forth below, 
(v) HLD/Apache certifies and warrants that the Release of the Right of 
Way and the Deed to the Webb one acre parcel shall be executed by 
the vested owner and shall convey marketable title. 
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(o) When all of the foregoing instruments have been received in escrow by 
Meridian, Meridian is instructed to deliver the Dedication Deed to Galena 
Park Boulevard to Draper City with instructions that said deed shall be 
recorded only on condition that the Plat of the Galena Subdivision be recorded 
simultaneously with said deed. 
(c) The Release/Abandonment of the Original Easement and the Deed to the Webb 
one acre shall be delivered to Holmes/Mesa or recorded when the Galena 
Subdivision is recorded. 
•(d) It is understood that the following conditions precedent must be met prior to 
the recording of the Plat for Galena Kills Subdivision: 
(i) HLD/Apache Builders must close on the purchase of the Galena 
Subdivision Property; and 
(ii) HLD/Apache Builders must post a good and satisfactory bond with 
Draper City and the Sewer District for the Galena Subdivision in 
connection with the recording of the Galena Subdivision Plat and for all 
other improvements as required under this Agreement; and 
(iii) HLD/Apache Builders shall cause all sewer easements required for the 
Galena and Parkway Subdivisions to be duly e"xecuted, delivered to and 
accepted~by Sa]t_Lake~ County Sewer Improvement District Nn. 1, 
including specifically, but not limitedjo^the sewer easement irom Salt „ 
Take~County from the Connection P"oint tcTthe Jordan PiverSewer 
^ Trunk Line. 
(iv) * Holmes/Mesa must close on the Smekens property included in 12300 
South Street and in Galena Park Boulevard. 
7. Closing on Webb Parcel. In connection with the escrow referred to above, 
HLD/Apache Builders shall deliver to Holmes/Mesa a Warranty Deed to the North one acre 
jpf the Webb parcel fronting on 12300 South and abutting the Rail Road on the East and the 
LLW Property on the Wesr:—The purch&srpnce for said acre is $iy,uou.OO. However, 
Holmes/Mesa shall be entitled to a credit for the net amounts owed by HLD/Apache to 
Holmes/Mesa for the amounts owed by HLD/Apache to Holmes/Mesa for Galena Park 
Boulevard property; Smekens property and 12300 South Street property as set forth herein. 
Thereafter, Holmes/Mesa shall complete the exchange with LLW and obtain the release of 
the LLW Trust Deed. 
8. Cancellation. After this Agreement has been signed by all of the Parties 
hereto it may nevertheless be cancelled by one party within a period of sixty (60) days from 
the date it has been signed by all of the parties hereto. In order to cancel under this 
provision, the party desiring to cancel must give the other parties hereto five (5) days written 
notice of intent to cancel setting forth the reason for the cancellation. This right of unilateral 
cancellation may be exercised only if (a) Draper City, UDOT or other governmental entity 
imposes any additional requirement on either party not contemplated by this Agreement 
which makes the development of either subdivision unprofitable; or (b) HLD/Apache 
Builders has not closed on the purchase or the Galena Property; or (c) the Galena 
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Subdivision has not recorded. From and after sixty (60) days from the date the last nam-
executes this Agreement, this Agreement shall become unconditional, irrevocable and cannot 
be cancelled. Further, this Agreement shall become unconditional, irrevocable and cannot be 
cancelled upon the first to happen of the following: (d) The recording of Parkway Phase I 
Subdivision Plat; or (e) The recording of Galena Subdivision Plat; or (f) The recording of 
the dedication deed for Galena Park Boulevard from Holmes/Mesa to Draper City. 
9. Conditions, Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, this Agreement 
will become effective, binding and enforceable and cannot be cancelled upon the first to 
happen of the following: (i) the closing and recording of HLD/Apache Builders* Durchase of 
the Galena Property; or (ii) the recording of either the Galena or the Parkway Subdivisions. 
10. Remedies upon Default. In addition to the remedies provided by law, if 
either party fails to perform any obligation arising out of this contract, the other party shall 
have the right to substitute performance and to recover such damages, losses, costs and 
expenses associated therewith from the other party. If either party fails to make any payment 
contemplated by this agreement as sti forth herein, the other 
party shall be entitled to receive interest on any liquidated amount at the rate of 12% Der 
annum. 
11. Arbitration. If either party fails to perform any covenant or obligation of 
this Agreement, the party in default shall pay all costs, expenses, and reasonable arbitration 
fees which the other party incurs in enforcing this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by the applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit 
or otherwise, all per the State Alternative Dispute Resolution Program. 
12. Incorporation of Exhibits. The exhibits attached hereto are incorporated 
herein as part of this Agreement. 
13. Modification of Agreement. No amendments or modifications of this 
Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by all of the parties hereto. 
14. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, including all exhibits, constitutes the 
entire understanding and agreement between the parties and any and all prior agreements, 
discussions and/or understandings are terminated and are of no force and effect. 
15. Successors and Assigns. Except as provided herein, all covenants and terms 
of the Agreement shall bind the successors and/or assigns of either party hereto. 
HLD/Apache shall not assign its interest under this agreement without the prior written 
consent of 
Hoimes/Mesa. The parties hereto shall, except as set forth herein, be liable for the duties, 
liabilities and obligations set forth herein even though an assignee may assume such liability 
and such assignor shall be released from liability only by a writing signed by the other Darrv. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Holmes/Mesa shall be released from liability hereunder "upon 
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the following condidons being met: (a) Holmes/Mesa has sold, transferred and conveyed all 
of their entire interest in the Parkway Property; (b) The buyer/assignee of said property 
assumes in writing all obligations of Holmes/Mesa hereunder; (c) the Parkway Subdivision 
Plat has been duly recorded; and (d) Holmes/Mesa or its Assignee has caused a Trust Deed 
to be recorded securing the performance of the obligations of Hoimes/Mesa and/or its assigns 
hereunder. Said Performance Trust Deed shall cover all of the lots of Parkway Phase One 
Subdivision and shall be subject to a development loan and bond on said Phase One and shall 
contain a partial release provision in accordance with the payment schedule and partial lien 
release provisions as set forth above. 
16. 
Agreement. 
Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of this 
17. Authority of Signer. The persons executing this Agreement warrant their 
authority to do so in behalf of each party. 
18. Quadrupling OTigfaflfr- The parties shall sign four originals of this 
Agreement. 





APACHE BUILDERS, L.L.C. 
/ / 
By: 
Irs: / 1^ 
MESA DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah 
Its: l0^<Ls ;<t£-r\T 
95t>/t>ark. subasr4.0 
10 
O l l n 
